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OVERCOMING POSNER
Gerard V. Bradley*
OVERCOMING LAW. By Richard A. Posner. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. 1995. Pp. x, 597. $39.95.

Richard Posner1 aims to "overcome" that "law" that is "a professional totem signifying all that is pretentious, uninformed,
prejudiced, and spurious in the legal tradition" (p. 21). By "legal
tradition" he mostly means, as the subjects treated in Overcoming
Law (hereinafter OL) show,2 some recent academic theorizing
about Law - its nature, substance, purpose - and about some of
our laws.
OL contains many previously published but revamped essays, to
which Posner has added a few new chapters and an introduction.3
The book is not, however, a "potpourri or an encyclopedia"; it is
meant to be read "consecutively," as a coherent whole (p. ix). The

* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. B.A. 1976, J.D. 1980, Cornell. - Ed. I
thank Alan Gunn and John Finnis for their comments on drafts of this review.
1. Richard Posner is Chief Judge of United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit.
2. Half of the book's chapters are engagements with individual theorists writing today,
often single leading works. There are chapters on John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust
(chapter 6); Bruce Ackerman's work, including We the People: Foundations (chapter 7);
Walter Berns's Government by Lawyers and Judges, COMMENTARY, June 1987, at 17 (chapter
8); Robert Bork's The Tempting of America (chapter 9); Morton Horwitz's two volume study
The Transformation of American Law (chapter 11); Martha Minow's Making All the Difference (chapter 12); Drucilla Cornell's, Dialogic Reciprocity and the Critique of Employment at
Wil~ 10 CARnozo L REV. 1575 (1989) (chapter 13); William Ian Miller's Bloodtaking and
Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland (chapter 14); Linda Hirshman's The
Book of "A," 70 TEXAS L. REv. 971 (1992) (chapter 15); Catharine MacKinnon's Only Words
(chapter 17); Patricia Williams's The Alchemy of Race and Rights (chapter 18); Ronald
Coase's works in law and economics (chapter 20); and Richard Rorty's philosophical writings
(chapter 22). One chapter is devoted to an earlier legal theorist's master work - James
Fitzjames Stephen's Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (chapter 10). Another chapter responds to
feminist critics of Posner's earlier book, Sex and Reason (chapter 16). Among the relatively
few topical chapters are treatments of the "judicial utility curve" (chapter 3), abortion
(though it is as much about Dworkinian legal theory) (chapter 5), pragmatism in law (chapter
19), the new institutional economics (chapter 21), legal rhetoric and advocacy (chapter 24),
blackmail and the Jaw of privacy (chapter 25), and homosexuality (chapter 26). In a separate
chapter Posner "revisits" his book Law and Literature (chapter 23). There is a chapter on the
legal profession in Germany and Great Britain, which really constitutes a review of two
books, one about lawyers in Nazi Germany, the other about detention in WW II Britain
(chapter4). The remaining two chapters deal with the American legal profession (chapter 1)
and the legal academy (chapter 2).
3. The chapters on Patricia Williams, Posner's Law and Literature, blackmail and privacy,
homosexuality, and legal rhetoric are new.
1898
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Introduction of the book "contains the fullest articulation to date"
of Posner's "overall theoretical stance" (p. ix).
OL is profitably read as an integrated work. It is a sustained
effort by our most prolific defender of economic analysis of law to
show that the limitations of that approach - which, Posner concedes in OL, are many and great - can be overcome without
resorting to philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics - the whole
"moral" approach to law (Parts II-III) - or without treating law
and legal reasoning as autonomous disciplines (Parts V-VI). It is in
philosophy and in legal reasoning that we find the "spurious," the
"pretentious," the "prejudiced," and the "uninformed" in the legal
tradition. Posner would welcome a not-distant future in which
traditional jurisprudence - a meld of the ethical and the legal has become irrelevant (pp. 79-80).
Economics survives this purge. Posner features it in an enterprise that he calls "legal theory," "the body of systematic thinking
about (or bearing closely on) law" (p. vii). Economics is,'he says,
one of three keys to "legal theory" (p. viii). Posner does not aim to
disturb existing practices, and OL contains just a handful of concrete reform proposals. The "thesis" of OL is that, fused together
with "liberalism" and "pragmatism,"4 economics can "transform
legal theory," and presumably, our understanding of Law and laws
(p. viii).
I shall argue in this review essay that Posner's roadmap is unreliable, that OL takes us on a journey far different from the one
Posner charts for the reader. My aim is descriptive, diagnostic, and
analytical - to clarify Posnerian "legal theory" and to trace its
transformative effects upon our laws.
I.

LIMITATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW

The most arresting feature of OL is Posner's compilation of the
limitations of economic analysis of law. These concessions are
neither surprising nor controversial. Most are obvious corollaries
of recognizing, as Posner must and does, that economic analysis is a
type of instrumental reasoning. Posner's concessions, numerous
and grave though they are, fail to convey the true depth and
breadth of the economic analyst's predicament. Furthermore, and
oddly, Posner never steps outside the economist's point of view,
even as he details what the reader will surely regard as the deeply
immoral implications of a strictly economic approach to law.
Among the implications of "typical" economic thinking, Posner
finds "torture and gruesome punishments, enforcing contracts of
4. On no coherent reading of OL can Posner mean to present either "liberalism" or
"pragmatism" - or, for that matter, economics - as an ethical system.
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self-enslavement, permitting gladiatorial contests" (p. 23). Economics typically implies "abolishing all welfare programs and other
forms of social insurance" (p. 23). Economics has no theory of distributive justice. For example, if beggars are initially assigned the
right to go door-to-door and solicit money or food, the rich might
organize and buy them off, effecting a market-generated form of
welfare. But there is no basis within economics to designate the
beggars, rather than the begged-from, as the initial assignees of
rights over begging (p. 23).
Posner also admits that economics cannot answer the question
whether we should maximize the wealth of the United States or of
the entire world (p. 22). The same scope question arises, Posner
continues, with respect to the treatment of foreigners, animals, the
profoundly retarded, trees, Jews in a Christian society, and fetuses. 5
This set of questions is about who is to be considered a "member of
the community" and "therefore a person whose welfare must be
considered" (p. 190).
How did economics come to this perilous state? Let us start
with Posner's basic economics. His economic project imagines that
individuals base decisions on "the costs to be incurred and the benefits to be reaped from alternative courses of action" (pp. 15-16).
This assumption - that human beings are intelligent calculators of
costs and benefits - is essential to economic models of behavior,
even though the assumption that humans always behave "rationally" is not. "[T]he models hold as useful approximations even
when the assumption [of rationality] is false" (p. 17).
The prototypical "economic" choice need not be and often is
not conscious so "there is no paradox in referring to rational choice
by animals" (p. 553). Posner does not consider this economics to
have any proper - i.e., limited, exclusive - subject matter. He
applies it well beyond familiar economic problems dealing with
markets and prices.6
Now, economic reasoning is a type of instrumental reasoning.
No type of instrumental reasoning can be put to human use without
some normative choice, or at least without positing some end or
goal. Economics neither generates nor judges in any noninstrumental - e.g., moral - sense the goals and objectives to which it
might identify the most efficient means. Just as "[n]othing in eco5. See pp. 190-91. Posner refers disparagingly to philosophy's inability to distinguish
computers from talking apes and retarded infants. See p. 191. Some philosophers may have
that difficulty, although on the whole, the economists seem to be worse off.
6. This seems to be the substance of Posner's dispute with Ronald Coase. See pp. 406-25.
Coase would evidently limit economic analysis to conventionally understood market phenomena See p. 415. Posner is famously committed to a wider application of economic reasoning to "nonmarket" behavior, such as surrogate motherhood and sexual behavior in
general.
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nomics prescribes an individual's goals" (p. 16), so too economics
does not settle social goals. You can ask, and economics will help
tell you, the most efficient way to produce poisonous gas, as well as
to build a hospital. Economics will not ask and cannot tell you why
you should.
'
The economist, qua economist, cannot proscribe goals or rule
out a priori any means. Take Posner's own wealth-maximization
criterion. That goal, along with the techniques of economic analysis, generate certain nonmoral evaluative judgments: this allocation
of resources is inefficient, that is counterproductive. Posner realizes
that slavery and child labor, for example, may be the most efficient
ways to maximize wealth. Mutilating a handful of criminals a year
probably is a more efficient deterrent than warehousing thousands
for years. Whether these potentially efficient uses of scarce resources ought to be adopted by persons is a question economics
does not consider.
These leading characteristics of economics as a type of instrumental reasoning - its incapacity to identify goals and moral indifference to apt means - are what I call economic reasoning's
"passive vices." They are not minor, and in that sense, passive,
shortcomings, for they establish the proposition that economic reasoning cannot settle what anyone, on any occasion, should, all
things considered, do. They are passive vices because they do not
obscure the distinctions that a healthy moral theory needs in order
to reach an "all things considered" decision. One can imagine this
economics peacefully coexisting with moral philosophy. In this construal, economics is the great middle part of the public policy story.
Economics is a useful module, one which needs to be jump-started
each morning, guided by a pilot who knows the destination and who
minds the rules of the road. In the "passive" story, economics could
be - would have to be - complemented and regulated by moral
philosophy.
Let us turn to economics' "active vices." An example lays one
such vice bare. Posner implicitly concedes that the beggar's need is,
from the economic standpoint, indistinguishable from the surplus of
the begged-from. The two realities - need and surplus - are, in
the economic calculus, represented by a single variable - that of
desires, interests, or "preferences." This commensuration permits
the calculations that make economic analysis possible. Once the
need of the beggar and the desire of the rich not to be begged from
are treated as units along a common metric, moral discrimination
between them is impossible. Bentham thought beggars should be
locked up because of the emotional distress that their begging
caused passersby (p. 23). These "mental externalities" could provide an economic justification, Posner concedes, for discrimination
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agaipst minorities. Economics thus becomes "a potential menace to
basic liberties" (p. 23).
Posner illustrates this potential by comparing the distress of
"conservative[s]" at the thought of people committing homosexual
acts to the liberty interest homosexuals have in performing such
acts. Many people, he says, "derive utility from laws to repress homosexual activity" (p .. 571). Should that "utility be weighed equally
with the utility" of homosexuals "in deciding whether repressive
measures are efficient" (p. 571)? Discounting the "utility" of repressing others' conduct would carry Posner "outside the boundaries of economics as they are generally, even generously,
understood today" (pp. 571-72). He says at one point that it would
carry him into moral and political philosophy (p. 23). Surely so, but
note that economics itself gives rise to the dilemma precisely by
treating very different realities - the choice to engage in sodomy
and the revulsion felt by those aware of that choice - as "units" of
the same thing. This is an "active vice" because you cannot think
your way out of the problem, once economics so sets it up. Practical reasoning, equipped with blunt and clumsy tools that economics
affords here, can scarcely do an intelligent job without setting up its
project differently.
The "active vices" of economic thinking tend to obscure the distinctions that practical reasoning needs to guide people to reach the
right conclusions. Another example is provided by the recent chess
match between Garry Kasparov and a super computer named
"Deep Blue." Commentators wondered whether the closeness of
the match - Kasparov eventually won - indicated that computers
have "minds" or whether people do not. The question arises precisely because of the assumption that, since there obviously is some
kind of "thinking" in no recondite or technical sense, which people
and machines do about equally well, people and machines - or at
least their "minds" - are the same. The assumption is unwarranted. There is a lot more to the mind than the type of mathematical thinking characteristic of chess playing. Only someone flirting
with reductionist accounts of human reasoning could get worried
about the chess machine.
Posner's analytical field is defined by "rationality," in the economic sense, wherever it is found. People and beavers are agents,
in this economic sense. The beaver's dam-construction compares
favorably as efficient production to anything a precocious infant
does. Trees are, as far as we can tell, unconscious, but they, like
people and beavers, are organic substances that "know" what they
need (water, nutrients) and seek it out (by spreading roots, by turning to the sun, and so on). The problem begins with identifying a
particular common capacity - the refined mathematics of chess or
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other forms of "rationality" as economics conceives it - and treating such limited rationality as constitutive of agency. Only a rationality wider than the limited rationality in question will notice the
profound differences between people and computers and between
babies and beavers. The "boundary question" - as Posner labels
this class of problems - is not so much a question not answerable
within economics. Rather, the economic answer - all active beings
are agents - is deeply untrue to reality, and its practical entailments are morally calamitous.
Posner describes this problem as "economist[s'] great difficulty
getting a clear 'fix' on such questions" (p. 22). But economics, as he
practices it, somehow finds its way of protecting the "autonomy" of
producers, and of the potentially productive, all Posnerian agents.
It is "equality," and the goals of distributive justice - assisting the
more or less unproductive and needy - that are off his radar
screen. The problem then is not that of a perplexed economics
humbly seeking rescue from contiguous, humanistic disciplines. It
is that Posnerian economics supplies bad answers.
Will economics welcome the help it needs to combat its "active
vices"? Not according to Posner:
[T]he use of economics to guide decision in the open areas of law
ought to be discussable without immersion in the deep waters of political and moral philosophy. It is true that some people insist on treating quite narrow and technical legal questions as microcosms of the
vastest social issues. They see antitrust cases as raising issues of political liberty rather than merely of efficient allocation of resources, contract cases as raising issues of human autonomy rather than merely of
transaction costs, corporate cases as raising issues of democracy
rather than issues concerning optimal investment, criminal cases as
raising deep issues of free will and autonomy rather than the issue of
how to minimize the social costs of crime. From time to time I shall
be glancing at efforts to philosophize about such matters. But I think
the economist can easily hold his own in these debates by showing
that the most fruitful framework for analyzing this range of legal
questions is an economic one. [pp. 21-22; footnote omitted]
The pleading rhetoric - "ought to be discussable"; "most fruitful
framework" - is a feeble substitute for a frank and robust confrontation with the predicament that Posner is in: that economics as he
envisages it would ignore, and thereafter profoundly threaten, political liberty, human autonomy, democracy, and other such ideals.
It must be emphasized that Posner never judges the various deficiencies of economics - boundary questions, gruesome punishments, and the rest - to be moral defects. . They are not the
immoral implications of economic thinking. They simply do not, he
says, correspond to our "intuitions."7
7. P. 23; see infra Part III.
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POSNER'S EVASION OF ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE

Posner serves up some "normative" analyses in OL. 8 He refers
to such seemingly moral evaluative concepts as "progress" (p. 449)
and "better" (p. 403). He says that "evaluation" of consequences is
the terminal point of policy decisions (p. 463). What else could all
this be, but some distinctly moral framework? Is the Posner of 0 L
a closet moralist?
No. Among the important antecedents of OL was some critical
comment in these pages9 on Posner's article The Jurisprudence of
Skepticism. 10 As Posner later related the substance of this criticism,11 he was "taken to task for ignoring the substantial literature
that treats law as a form of practical reason." 12 Steve Burton's
short but cogent critique forcefully brought to Posner's attention
the works of H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, and John Finnis. Collectively, their scholarship constitutes the post-war Anglo-American
analytical legal philosophy that Posner means to argue against in
OL. These authors treat law and legal reasoning in a way very different from the way Austin, Holmes, and Posner treat them.
Burton's apt criticism was that Posner had not even considered
their moralistic approach to law, an approach rendered invisible by
Posner's "scientific" substitute. 13
8. Posner does not use the tenn "nonnative" in any discernibly consistent sense. Most
often Posner contrasts it with "positive" and its cousins, "explanatory" and "descriptive."
Posner says that judges act "nonnatively" whenever they decide a case which cannot be decided "by reference to precedent or some clear statutory text." P. 21. Posner appears to
mean that in such cases judges make rather than follow law. See p. 235. But Posner leaves no
room for moral reasoning in this "nonnative" enterprise. He says elsewhere that
"[e]conomics has value in the nonnative as well as the positive analysis of sex." P. 569. This
is consistent with the view that economic analysis is commonly an aid to lawmaking.
Occasionally, Posner develops what he simply calls "nonnative" analyses, and sometimes
he calls for economic "evaluation" of consequences. See p. 571. 1\vo leading examples are
Posner's treatment of AIDS policy and of the military ban on homosexuals. See pp. 561, 56971. On AIDS policy he makes a forthright recommendation, but only by assuming a detenninable goal - reduction of AIDS - and asking whether criminalizing sodomy is a "realistic"
means of reaching that goal. Seep. 561. On the issue of homosexuals in the military, Posner
concedes that economics fails to provide a clear prescription. See p. 571.
Posner also laments the "relentlessly nonnative" quality of contemporary constitutional
theory, which he identifies with worrying about the "legitimacy" of leading "individual
rights" decisions. P. 171. He disputes the "nonnative" adequacy of Bruce Ackennan's con·
stitutional theory, apparently equating normativity here with "legitimacy." P. 219.
Posner ordinarily describes "economic theory" as "non-nonnative" and "positive." P.
427. But he also speaks of "economic theory, with all its nonnative as well as positive bag·
gage," and of the "nonnative" theory of antitrust which conforms to the dictates of wealth
maximization. P. 173.
9. See Steven J. Burton, Judge Posner's Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 81 MICH. L. REV. 710
(1988).
10. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988).
11. RICHARD A. PosNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 72 n.3 (1990) [hereinafter
POJ].
12. Id. at 72.
13. Burton, supra note 9, at 717-18.
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Posner mentioned Burton's criticism in Problems of Jurisprudence, (hereinafter POI) but referred readers to a book that Posner
- incorrectly, in my view - recommended as "illustrat[ive]" of the
approach Burton recommended.14 Posner confessed, in any event:
"I am unable to find the content in this literature." 15 Readers' of
14. POJ, supra note 11, at 72 n.3 (citing ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION (1989)).
15. Id. at 72. That Posner had a very poor grasp of what the literature says is evidenced
by, among many other signals in POJ, his assertion that Finnis is an intuitionist operating on
Holmesian "can't helps." Id. at 352. The whole basis for Finnis's work is the contention that
first practical principles, though self-evident to those who attend without obscuring preconceptions to the relevant data, are not intuitions - insights without data. Posner misunderstands what Hart, Raz, and Finnis mean by "practical." He says, in reference to this
literature, that "practical" reason is in "contrast to the methods of 'pure reason' by which we
determine whether a proposition is true or false, an argument valid or invalid." Id. at 71.
This is certainly not what Hart, Raz, and Finnis have in mind. "Practical reason" is reasoning
(pure, if you like) about what to do. This includes, but is much more than, the logical coherence that Posner seems mainly to mean by "pure reason." "Practical reasoning" is to be
distinguished from "theoretical," or "speculative," reasoning (again, "pure" if you like) about
what is, not what is to be brought about by human action. This distinction was clear from
Burton's brief critique. It is the presupposition of Hume's naturalistic fallacy: that no
"ought" conclusion validly can be drawn (ram a string of "is" premises.
Posner takes up in POJ Hume's dictum, and he rejects the "extreme skepticism" he thinks
it entails. Id. at 352. Posner obviously thinks that if Hume is right, one has no alternative but
skepticism. Not so. Finnis, for a notal:!le example, agrees that one cannot deduce an "ought"
from a string of "is" premises. But Fmnis is no skeptic. If Hume is right (and he is), it simply
means that moral truths are not valid (are not truths) due to their correspondence with what
is.
Posner also seems to believe that the naturalistic fallacy makes what he calls "moral objectivity" impossible. The "problem of moral objectivity is that there are neither facts to
which moral principles correspond (as scientific principles appear to correspond to things in
nature) nor a strong tendency for moral principles to converge." Id. at 236. He makes a
similar point in OL. Seep. 449. But moral principles are not true because they correspond to
things already out there now in nature. What Posner means by "converge," and why it is the
consummate evidence of objectivity is not explained. In any event, Posner seems to believe
that any putative moral norm worth considering must be either a command of nature or as
certain and as objective as technical calculations are.
Posner makes strange attempts to show a fallacy in the "naturalistic fallacy" argument: "if
a watch is not working, it ought to be fixed," and a "police officer should not sleep on duty."
POJ, supra note 11, at 352. But his attempts fail, for here we have either a moral "ought"
smuggled into our premises (i.e., police officers are persons for whom it would be wrong to
sleep on duty) or in the watch case a distinctly nonmoral evaluative (i.e., functional) ought.
Posner seems to think that moral "objectivity" is possible only if moral decisions can be
reduced to technical questions. This assumed criterion of moral objectivity obscures Posner's
vision. He refers to "Sartre's imaginary 'Pierre,' who must decide whether to join the Resistance or take care of his aged mother." P. 451. Pierre's "dilemma" represents to Posner a
"radical indeterminacy" in morals, common in law, for "whichever way Pierre chooses he
may never know whether he chose right." P. 451. Why cannot it be that, either way, Pierre
chooses correctly? Why is the reality of two or more incompatible, morally upright courses
of action a cause of despair? Is it not rather the essential precondition for free choice? The
"dilemma" here is that there is great emotional difficulty associated with leaving unattended
certain options, but is that not commonly the case? Couples who marry and choose to have
children are obviously choosing something worthwhile, just as they realize that the commitment that marriage and parenting entails will require them to forego many other worthwhile
pursuits - hobbies, career opportunities, friendships, and so on. When we focus on the
foregone opportunities there is a certain wistfulness, but that does not make for a moral
dilemma.
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OL will learn even less about that philosophical alternative than did
readers of POI. Finnis appears nowhere in 0 L. Raz appears once
(p. 465) in a laundry list of academics. Hart appears inconsequentially as party to the Hart-Devlin debate (p. 262) and in a footnote
to Posner's treatment of the judicial utility function (p. 132 n.42).
Posner refers readers of OL to his prior treatment of natural law
and positivism in POJ. There he described "natural law" as "basic
political morality." 16 But this is inaccurate. "Natural law" is, on all
accounts, about rectitude in all human choosing, including (not primarily) choice by persons exercising public authority. "Natural
law," in other words, is a moral system and not a mere doctrine
about law or politics.
Posner is sensitive to the criticism that his account of law is reductionist (p. 15). But he misunderstands the criticism. Burton was
saying that Posner's legal theory leaves no room for unrestricted
practical reasoning that is all instrumental - technical, scientific reasoning. Posner thinks that Burton's charge was that Posner's
particular - i.e., economic - type of instrumental reasoning is too
narrow. Economics, according to Posner, "far from being reductionist," is "the instrumental science par excellence" (pp. 15-16).
Posner admits that instrumental rationality may not be the only tenable conception of rationality (p. 553 n.2), but where one would
expect some reference to the classical tradition of practical reasoning - a reference, say, to able contemporary natural theorists like
Finnis and Robert George - Posner refers the reader to a chapter
of Robert Nozick's The Nature of Rationality. 11 What Posner
means to recommend in that difficult chapter is not stated, nor is it
clear upon reading Nozick. Nozick does not, in any event, defend
anything like the perspective that Burton tried to bring to Posner's
attention.
In the climactic moment of OL, Posner concedes that his "epistemological defense" of liberalism - in sum, his essentially amoral
analytical framework - has been criticized "by philosophical realists and Catholics, among others."18 The realist view holds that
16. See POJ, supra note 11, at 230.
17. Seep. 553 n.2 (citing ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONAUI'Y ch. 5 (1993)).
18. P. 451. Of course, Catholics are philosophical realists; at least a realist epistemology
is necessary to sustain the Church's teaching, emphasized often by Pope John Paul II, that
there are universally binding exceptionless moral norms.
The most troubling aspect of OL is Posner's recurring caricaturization of the Catholic
Church when he should be engaging in counterarguments. Even so, Posner nowhere cites,
much less explains, a single Church document, even in the area of sexual morality. He nowhere cites Finnis, a Catholic who is arguably the world's leading legal philosopher. Posner
recommends to readers Ronald Dworkin's discussion of religious views on abortion, a portion of Life's Dominion that is largely about Roman Catholic teachings. See p. 188 n.38.
Unfortunately, this part of Life's Dominion is so completely inaccurate that only someone
with the slimmest familiarity with Church teaching could recommend it. See Gerard V.
Bradley, Life's Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 N.D. L. REv. 329 (1993). Dworkin's ideologi-
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"there are objective truths about science, morality, politics, and law,
which we can find by the light of reason" (p. 451). Posner responds:
"I shall not try to discuss" this view, because "it belongs to the domain of indeterminate high theory" (p. 451). Posner distinguishes
and unconvincingly refutes a criticism by Alasdair Macintyre, a
learned and critical philosopher who eventually became a Catholic
and has identified himself most conspicuously with Thomism.
Posner does not mention any of the vast Mclntyrian corpus, save a
little-known one-page fragment (p. 451).
Posner early in OL gives readers the impression that his project's success hinges upon a stable resolution of the boundary question.19 Now he says that "the idea of the self ... the 'real me,' is
itself a construct" (p. 534). He continues: "I shall not try to solve
the mystery of who this 'we' is who 'constructs' our various public
selves" (p. 535). Posner's pragmatic counsel on the issue of abortion is: muddle through it.20 Of Dworkin's "law as integrity,"
cal explanation of Church teaching that abortion is always wrong - basically it is a rhetorical
instrument wielded by the clerical ruling class - is congenial to Posner.
Posner says in 0 L that "traditional preoccupations" of jurisprudence will be "increasingly
irrelevant." P. 79. Those still so preoccupied resemble "medieval canonists" engaged in
"hermetic discourse" that befits "a profession that seeks to justify its privileges by pointing to
the high obscurity of its thoughts." P. 80. Posner elsewhere compares lawyers' intellectualization of their activity to
the relation between clerisy and laity in the medieval Church. Like many clerics, professionals practice "unworthy arts to raise their importance among the ignorant," including
"an affectation of mystery in all their writings and conversations relating to their profession • • . and a demeanor solemn, contemptuous and highly expressive of selfsufficiency."
P. 58 (quoting JEFFREY LIONEL BERLANT, PROFESSION AND MONOPOLY: A STUDY OF
MEDICINE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 89 (1975)).
Posner squarely invites the reader to choose between religion - with which he has identified much of the "moralistic" rival he should be arguing against - and reality:
When Cardinal Bellarmine refused to look through Galileo's telescope at the moons of
Jupiter, whose existence seemed to refute the orthodox view that the planets were fixed
to the surface of crystalline spheres, he was not being irrational. He was just refusing to
play the science game, in which theories are required to conform to observations, to "the
facts," rather than the other way around. Bellarmine's game was faith. It is a common
game in our society as well, taking many forms, the cosmological one being astrology.
Another game of faith today is "political correctness." If you show a player in that game
a sheaf of scientific reports purporting to show that the races or the sexes differ in their
potential for doing mathematics, the player will refuse to read them; the empirical investigation of racial and sexual differences is rejected in that game, just as the empirical
investigation of planetary motion was rejected by Bellarmine.
P. 7. Posner is grotesquely wrong on the facts here. Bellarmine, a leading theologian of the
day, was on friendly terms with Galileo. Bellarmine accepted Galileo's invitation to look
through the telescope in April of 1611, and thanked Galileo for the opportunity. There was,
twenty-three years later, a sharp, regrettable, and on both sides unnecessary disagreement
between the Church and Galileo. See E. McMullin, Bellarmine, Robert, in DICTIONARY OF
SCIENTIFIC BIOGRAPHY 587 (C. Gillispie ed., 1970). But it was not part of a "faith game,"
swinging free from observable reality, as Posner implies. Has Posner ever wondered why
science has thrived in the Christian West? Or considered how Galileo, who lived and died a
Catholic, came to be such a great scientist?
19. See supra text accompanying note 5.
20. Seep. 404. Posner may think that the positive law - specifically, the first sentence of
the Fourteenth Amendment - confines the effects of this uncertainty to unborn children. If
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Posner dismissively remarks: "I get nothing out of such high-falutin' prose" (p. 403).
Posner states clearly his "prediction," which he devoutly wishes
to come to pass, that "traditional jurisprudence" will become irrelevant (p. 79). He believes, it seems to me, that entirely material developments in the law market, computer technology,
accountancy, engineering - will displace the moralistic approach
to law. Posner evidently hopes and trusts that information - refined and organized, to be sure - about stuff, including people, will
make morality obsolete (see pp. 79-80).
The "active vices" of economic reasoning have had their way.
Remember that the "passive" story, which Posner can easily be
heard to recite, especially in the Introduction, imagines some noneconomic determination of ends and ethically suitable means, matters upon which economics confesses its incompetence. The
"boundary questions" seemed to be raised in this context.
Consider, now, what Posner says about "muddling through"
abortion. He still says that the "economic approach" cannot answer the question whether abortion should be restricted; pragmatism is brought in to round out the approach (p. 404). Pragmatism,
however, does not answer the question any more than economics
does. Pragmatism, in Posner's hands, simply asserts that abortion is
an area "where a lack of common ends precludes rational resolution" (p. 404). Pragmatism's counsel is simply to wait - "until a
consensus of sort based on experience with a variety of approaches
to abortion emerged" (p. 405). We have heard Posner say that economic - i.e., rational - analysis needs posited ends to get going,
and we thought he would deploy "pragmatism" and "liberalism" to
generate those ends. But Posner's pragmatism, if not liberalism,
does not generate ends and goals either. Posnerian pragmatism
seems now to serve the outcomes generated by economics.
It's time to consider these curious aides to economics: pragmatism and liberalism.
Ill.

LIBERALISM AND PRAGMATISM

Let us start with liberalism. Posner is pretty clear about what it
comprises: the "neutrality principle" - the liberal state is "neutral
about substantive values"21 - and the "harm principle" - the state
so, he is quite mistaken. The Amendment, it may be assumed, guarantees some rights but
only to "persons born and naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Obviously, without some stable
account of "personhood," newborns and others with various deficiencies may be characterized as "subpersonal" beings, the results of failed attempts at genuinely personal
reproduction.
21. Seep. 449. This is very hard to square with most of the rest of what Posner says about
constitutional judging. See pp. 171-255. According to Posner, in the end a judge must decide

May 1996]

Overcoming Posner

1909

may justifiably curtail liberty only to prevent palpable "harms" to
third parties (pp. 23-24). Posner does not say that these two elements of liberalism are implied or entailed by our positive law; he
thinks much of our law is paternalistic - that is, illiberal (p. 25).
Posner says in one place that he is simply taking his "stand" here on
"issues of political and moral philosophy" (p. 23). More in harmony with the central tenets of OL, he says that our "liberal intuitions" are strong. We cannot be talked out of them.22 Standard
liberal types - explorer, maker, free-thinker, scientist - "are
types I [Posner] like," though he quickly adds that "[t]his ideal has
no "solid grounding in pragmatism or anything else" (p. 29).
Posner clings to the harm principle of "classical liberalism" "whether rightly or wrongly" (p. 24).
This is the language of distinctly nonmoral "can't helps." We
find ourselves holding the "neutrality" and "harm" principle - except that Posner allows that "we" are erratic liberals, for we cling to
a number of paternalistic policies. There is no anterior set of moral
principles from which liberalism is derived, nor within which we
might develop and apply these "intuitions." So, Posner offers no
argument directly for our liberalism. He, submits that none is
needed: "[U]ngroundedness is characteristic of many of our mostly
firmly held norms (p. 190). "We reason from our bedrock beliefs"
- against slavery and infanticide - "not to them" (p. 191).
Is there anything that warrants our liberalism? Posner holds
that by liberalism's consequences we shall know its value. It is very
successful in practice. He says that the "strongest states" - Britain
in the nineteenth century, the United States in the twentieth have been "liberal" (pp. 24-25). Well, the Third Reich, decidedly
illiberal, gave the allies a pretty good contest in the Second World
War. A hardly liberal Japan gave the United States a run for its
money in World War II, and a still illiberal Japanese society is very
productive economically. Besides, the liberalism that Posner aims
to defend so pragmatically - consisting of the neutrality and harm
principles - has only partially been realized in the United States,
beginning only in the late 1960s. Victorian Britain hardly subscribed to liberal tenets, as James Fitzjames Stephen eloquently
testified.
open cases on instinct, not analysis, on the basis of his or her own values that, like everyone
else's, are "can't helps." P. 192. Posner means to rule out of public decisionmaking "comprehensive doctrines," and he does so by supposing that we, including judges among us, hold
"bedrock" convictions without supporting theories. But treating value judgments as "can't
helps" does not save them from nonneutrality, even if one holds that "imposing" them is
somehow inevitable. The exercise becomes the entirely nonneutral one of imposing values
one cannot rationally defend.
22. "There is no intellectual procedure that will or should force us to abandon them." P.
23.
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Posner claims that the twentieth century "is rich with evidence
that communal alternatives to liberalism, whether fascist or socialistic, are monstrous, nonviable, or both" (p. 27). Here is a criterion
different from raw intuition. I agree that "fascistic and socialistic"
alternatives are not preferable to liberalism, but that hardly exhausts the alternatives. Besides I would defend that judgment ethically; Posner cannot do so. Posner says he will defend liberalism
"pragmatically" by comparing its consequences with consequences
of such alternatives as "social democracy and moral conservatism"
(p. 29). But he relies on the flimsiest anecdotal evidence, and the
anecdotes are not even true.
Posner asserts that "liberalism creates the conditions that experience teaches are necessary for personal liberty and economic
prosperity" (p. 24). He has in mind spheres of privacy and free
markets: "Liberalism fosters the exchanges of information that are
necessary to scientific and technological progress, enlists uncoerced
citizen support, maximizes productive output, encourages and rewards competence, prevents excessive centralization of decisionmaking, weakens competing loyalties to family or clan, and defuses
sectarian strife" (p. 25).
Maybe, up to a point, but it seemed that Posner intended liberalism to alleviate the deficiencies of a strictly economic legal theory.
Posner concedes now that liberalism "is no more successful than
economics in dealing with boundary issues" (p. 27); it is "not a complete philosophy of government and law"; and it is "in tension with
democracy" (p. 25). Posner's liberalism heads off the chaos produced by the economists' mental externalities only by bald stipulation. Where is the needed supplement or corrective to economic
reasoning? Does Posner's pragmatism, if not his liberalism, provide
a solid grounding for identifying who or what is part of the community - for prohibiting slavery, infanticide, gruesome punishment?
Posner is anxious to distinguish his brand of pragmatism from
the leading post-modernist brand - what he calls "the excess of
pragmatism" (p. 317). Post-modernists like Richard Rorty and
Stanley Fish are "not merely antimetaphysical, which is fine, but
also antitheoretical" (p. 317). Posner is certainly not inclined to the
dreamy, glib, leftist political rhetoric of Rorty. Though resolutely
antimetaphysical, Posner does not question external reality as such.
Posner is no solipsist.
Posner's pragmatism is distinctly a via negativa. It "is not in the
business of supplying foundations" (p. 29). It is conceived to engender doubt about "foundations," and is "especially dubious" that
"analytic philosophy [or] legal reasoning can be used to establish
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moral duties or legal rights." 23 The pragmatist is "suspicio[us] of
propositions" not provable by scientific methods - like the maxims of common sense and "the claims of metaphysics and theology. "24 Posner's pragmatists are hard-headed scientific types. They
do not ground claims about things as ethereal as the propositions
that it is always wrong to kill infants and that slavery is wrong regardless of its efficiency.. Pragmatism, it seems, is what we call not
worrying about the limits of economic analysis.
Posner's "pragmatic jurisprudence" "plants no trees" but clears
away "underbrush" (p. 405). It "signals an attitude, an orientation,
at times a change of direction" (p. 405). The pragmatist is antidogmatic, anti-metaphysical, and skeptical about "truth with a capital T," but "respect[s] those lower case truths we call facts" (p. 377).
The pragmatist is well-informed, open-minded, empirical, forwardlooking, practical, experimental. Pragmatism connotes a determination to "use law as an instrument for social ends" (p. 405; emphasis added). Evidently, we cannot resolve to evaluate pragmatism by
its consequences. We are pragmatists when we evaluate other
things - like liberalism - by their consequences, and not by their
truth.
Posner specifically addresses the relation between pragmatism
and economics - "the most highly developed instrumental concept
of law" (p. 403) - particularly in light of the criticism that the latter's defenders have failed to ground it in some ethical tradition.
The criticism is that economics needs an enveloping ethical theory
to humanize it. Posner responds: "The criticism is sound as observation but not as criticism" (p. 403). He adds: "Pragmatists are
unperturbed by a lack of foundations" (p. 403). Posner identifies
the observation as the idea that law should maximize wealth (p.
403). He says that the relevant ground for criticism is whether an
23. P. 9. I can only suppose that Posner means moral bases for legal rights, since he does
not seem to question that legal texts - the United States Code or the Constitution - establish some legal rights.
24. P. 9. Posner seems to think all metaphysics is a matter of faith-based statements
about very elusive realities, if metaphysics refers to any real thing at all. Not so. The central
plot device of the movie Toy Story is metaphysical. When Buzz Lightyear first appears
among Woody the Cowboy, Mr. Potato Head, Bo-Peep, and the other toys in Andy's bedroom, his speech and demeanor mark him as somehow different. At first he seems just a bit
more earnest than the others, slightly out-of-place, like the kid who studies during recess. It
is soon apparent that the problem is in his self-understanding. Just before the characters
deliver lines that identify the precise anomaly, the eight-year old metaphysician next to me at
the theater blurted it out: "He doesn't know he's a toy!" Buzz Lightyear thought he was
really a space ranger. The rest of the movie is about Buzz coming to grips with the reality
that he is not a Space Ranger, or any other person. He is really just a toy. Toys are not
persons.
·
The "reallys" signify elements in a deep structure common to things that can be studied
but not altered by human thought. This is metaphysics, which takes its name from the prosaic reality that Aristotle's book after The Physics was about such things. Aristotle did not
give it a title. We call it The Metaphysics - meaning after Physics.

1912

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:1898

economics of wealth-maximization is the "best" approach for the
American legal system to follow (pp. 403-04). Just so, but we are
trying to settle what it here means to say "best." Posner means that
it "fits" us, just where we are at, but economics, he seems to concede, does not fit us. Pragmatism sounds like a way of saying that
that deficiency no longer troubles us, or at least not Posner.
Posner's pragmatism, I submit, expresses the implications of
economic analysis of law, and very, very little else. There is absolutely nothing in Posner's pragmatism that impedes - in the slightest - the unfolding of whatever "normative" conclusions emerge
from economic analysis of law. The pragmatist is interested in the
consequences - palpable, real, testable, observable consequences
- of legal reform proposals (p. 290). So, too, the economist: "Economics imagines the individual not as 'economic man,' but as - a
pragmatist" (p. 16). Law and economics, according to Posner,
"epitomizes the operation in law of the ethic of scientific inquiry,
pragmatically understood" (p. 15). He is convinced that "[m]odern
economics can furnish the indispensable theoretical framework for
the empirical research that law so badly needs" (p. 19).
Now, when we hear Posner saying that "[t]he economic approach cannot be the whole content of legal pragmatism" (p. 404),
we hear an emphasis upon "whole." When economic analysis is unsuitable, pragmatism serves to prevent recourse to noneconomic
thought, even if just to criticize the implications of economics.
Pragmatism does not supplement economic reasoning. It is not the
hero of the "passive" story. Pragmatism instead cuts off would-be
rescuers, like moral philosophy, at the pass. Pragmatism is the bodyguard of economics, protecting its autonomy against harm from
competing practical visions.
IV.

POSNER'S "CAN'T HELPS"

My hypothesis is that "liberalism" and "pragmatism" are
dummy outfits fronting for economics. If that is true, it would seem
that OL is self-refuting, for Posner seemed to allow in his Introduction that economics alone is inadequate, and even disastrous. Let
us test my hypothesis a bit.
Pragmatists do not deny that slavery is wrong. Posner the pragmatist does not say: "Let us have slavery!" The pragmatist would
"disconnect[] the whirring machinery of philosophical abstraction
from the practical business of governing our lives and societies" (p.
463). Pragmatism does not upset the practices that appear to rest
on the now-shaken foundations but aims to show that their "validity
depends on the evaluation of their consequences" (p. 463). But this
is viciously or vacuously circular. The "practice" that rests on the
foundationless conviction that slavery is wrong is the prohibition of
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slavery. Is that consequence a thing of value? I think so, and would
argue for it. Posner seems to think so, but would not argue for it.
Moral reasoning and the conclusions people reach on the basis
of it pop up in OL as "facts" about people's attitudes, much like
"mental externalities." Some practices "revolt us." Posner remarks
that "[o]ur primary motives for not killing children are indeed biological and sentimental" (p. 191). The pragmatist does not enter
into the moral discourse of ordinary citizen's deliberations about
abortion or slavery or infanticide. Posner tersely says: "The statement that it is wrong to torture children ... is merely a descriptive
statement about our morality, not a normative statement" (p. 36).
Posner appropriates - "gets a fix" on - what we hold to be
morally true by assimilating those truths to economics. But his
translation of moral truths into pragmatically conceived "facts" dramatically alters the entity_ translated. The move is a simple factual
mistake - we do reason to conclusions like, "slavery is wrong."
The move is also intrinsically naive and empirically unavailable.
Posner thinks we can go from counting just so many "revulsions" to
a social consensus that, say, "slavery is wrong." We cannot. Let me
explain.
If "we" are agreed not to have "slavery," slavery cannot be just
the name of something we abhor. How would "we" know that
"we" are referring to the same thing when we find ourselves simultaneously abhorring something? Ralph abhors broccoli, Billy might
abhor politicians, Jane might abhor how women are treated within
the family, and Mary might abhor Barney the dinosaur. Even if
they express this feeling at about the same time, there is no consensus. If they all shout "yes" at the same time, they still have not
approved or agreed to anything, unless there is a proposition identifiable as that to which "yes" is their response.
Posner supposes that "we" refer to the same t~g as "slavery."
So, slavery is a proposition or at least a definite something. What is
it? The "slavery" "we" condemn is, presumably, not merely a practice in which people work on cotton farms, or where people of dark
complexion work for light-skinned people, or a system of outdoor
work below the Mason-Dixon line. These were features of the "history of Negro slavery" that Posner says makes people very upset (p.
305), but they are all accidental features of that "slavery" that we
condemn. Posner soundly remarks that legal analysis runs amok
when it treats "slavery" promiscuously as a metaphor (p. 212), using
it to condemn situations like anti-abortion laws, which are, Posner
says, significantly different. He says that this confuses the essence
of a thing and its attributes. It may. But he has veered to the other
extreme, into a strict nominalism that is itself incapable of a stable
account of "essence" and "accident."
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'When people say "slavery is wrong," they have a description of
"slavery" in mind. The essential or defining feature is, I submit, its
morally decisive aspect or aspects. Is it, as the abolitionists alleged,
interference with slaves' freedom of conscience? Does slavery violate principles of just labor relations?25 Is slavery wrong because it
treats persons as property, as commodities? If so, we now have a
good reason to reject any other public policy that possesses the
same characteristic. The answer to this question will be, I submit, a
distinguishing immorality of slavery.
"Slavery" just cannot be distinguished as a something about
which we might hold evaluative views on Posner's account of
morals. The sterility of Posner's account is most apparent in his
comments on self-enslavement, which, as he implicitly concedes, economics suggests should be legal (p. 23). He reduces "slavery" to a
"name" we give to some phenomenon "that we abhor," but not to
"outwardly rather similar things" like joining the army, becoming a
Catholic priest, or being sentenced to prison (p. 304). Well, why is
not the priesthood prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment? Posner says - can only say - that it is a form of "involuntary servitude" we happen not to abhor (p. 304). The question remains, how
do we distinguish it from the disapproved kind?
Posner is entangled in his own web when discussing Griswold v.
Connecticut. 2 6 He calls Griswold the "first of the sexual liberty
cases" (p. 186). He attributes this "national embarrassment" of a
case to the "sectarian" pressure of a single interest group - the
Catholic Church.27 He grounds his rejection of the Connecticut law
not in any theory of constitutional interpretation, but in "instinct,"
an "imperative felt need for intervention" (p. 192). 'What triggered
the feeling? He asserts that the only practical effect of the law was
to deprive lower-class women of effective birth control (p. 204). Is
this the feeling-triggering effect? But feelings, unlike propositions
and supporting arguments, are essentially private and
incommunicable.
Is Griswold authority for invalidating all "embarrassing" laws?
Posner says the law invalidated in Griswold was an "embarrassment" just like the embarrassment of
a law forbidding remarriage, or limiting the number of children a married couple may have, or requiring the sterilization of persons having
genetic defects, or denying the mothers of illegitimate children paren25. Some anti-abolitionists claimed that slaves were treated better by their masters than
northern wage laborers were treated by the captains of industry.
26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27. See pp. 193-94. Of course, the Catholic Church, neither in 1965 nor now, holds that
its teaching on contraception is "sectarian." The Church teaches that it is a moral truth accessible to unaided reason. POPE PAUL VI, Humanae Vitae, in 5 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS,
1958-1981, at 223-24 (Claudia Carlen Ihm ed., 1981).
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tal rights, or forbidding homosexuals to practice medicine, or forbidding abortion even when necessary to spare a woman from a crippling
or debilitating illness, or requiring the tattooing of people who carry
the AIDS virus, or - coming closest to Griswold itself - requiring·
married couples to have a minimum number of children unless they
prove that they are infertile. [p. 194]

Is this a laundry list of things Posner just happens to dislike, with
no internal relation save the existential one of being Posner's "can't
helps"? Posner might be asserting that there is a common intelligible feature in all these "embarrassments." What is it? Is it not a
common moral defect? Whatever it is, it serves as a premise from
which each of the negative conclusions can be drawn. If so, then
Griswold is not just a "can't help" case.
Posner's professed aim is to embed his economic reasoning in a
world populated by lots of fixed moral points. Why not take the
direct route? Why not connect to "our intuitions" through a philosophical or practical commitment to democracy as, simply, popular
decisionmaking?
Posner is deeply reserved in his commitment to democracy, if he
is not actually antidemocratic. Democracy disperses power and
thus enables "people to enforce their dislike of other people's selfregarding behavior" (p. 25). In "its practical operation ignorance is
pervasive, selfishness is salient, and at times a disinterested malevolence is at work" (p. 26). Our representatives are little better than
the people they represent. "Our statute books overflow with vicious, exploitive, inane, ineffectual, and extravagantly costly laws"
- and there would be more if our "democracy were more populist"
than it is (p. 26). To show that the vox populi is an uncertain guide,
Posner even invites the reader to imagine some Hitler-style demagogue leading us to do away with civil liberties (p. 219).
Posner says that liberals, like him, want to limit the scope of
democracy through separation of powers and judicial review. Since
the latter is the nonpopulist element, it must be the deep solution to
the problems of democracy. Now we have come face-to-face with
law, particularly constitutional review by courts. It is time to examine, explicitly and in detail, the role of economics in Posner's
theory of law.
V.

LEGAL THEORISTS AND LEGAL THEORY

Nothing in what I have said or will have to say about Posner
casts any doubt on the truth that economics provides an invaluable
service to the legal enterprise by identifying likely consequences costs and benefits - of proposed courses of action. Posner's comment on rent control laws nicely exemplifies the value of this
service:
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The beneficiaries are plain to see: they are the tenants when the rentcontrol law is adopted. The victims are invisible: they are the future
would-be tenants, who will face a restricted supply of rental housing
because landowners will have a diminished incentive to build rental
housing and owners of existing apartment buildings will prefer to sell
rather than rent the apartments in them. Economics brings these victims before the analyst's eye, literature, and the type of legal scholarship that imitates literature, does not.28

Posner's recurring criticism of academic legal reformers, and it is
generally sound, is not that when they recommend adopting, say,
rent control laws they make a mistake in calibrating its costs and
benefits. It is, rather, that they simply ignore the consequences of
the measures they recommend. Of Drucilla Cornell's Hegelian proposal to outlaw employment at will, Posner says that although it is
"not . . . demonstrably wrong . . . it is irresponsible, because if
adopted it might very well impose immense social costs - and
costs born mainly by workers themselves, the intended beneficiaries
of the proposal - that she has not [even] considered" (p. 311). So,
John Hart Ely has a "weak sense of fact" (p. 205); the "essential
facts" concerning the subject of Martha Minow's book "are missing" (p. 295); Patricia Williams is "careless about facts" (p. 377),
"blur[s] the line between fiction and truth" (p. 375), and her feelings on race, like Catharine MacKinnon's on pornography, have
"far outrun the facts" (p. 367); Rorty has a "deficient sense of fact"
(p. 444).
Posner makes a related criticism of academic lawyers - that
they do not possess the social scientific expertise that their subject
matter requires. Thus, Morton Horwitz's psychologizing is "irresponsibly amateur" (p. 283); "[c]onstitutional lawyers know little
about their proper subject matter - a complex of political, social,
and economic phenomena. They know only cases" (p. 208); Minow
is not the expert she needs to be in labor and finance markets
(p. 294).
The more politically left of these writers - notably Williams,
MacKinnon, Horwitz, and Rorty - come under Posner's indictment for Utopianism. They would reform a world they know nothing about. They seem to think that the world is infinitely malleable,
just so much flexible clay to be molded per the theorists' creative
design. This is, for Posner, the post-modernist corruption of pragmatism. He rightly scorns it.
Posner is right that many policy proposals stand or fall on their
probable consequences. The right answer to many questions de28. P. 381 (footnote omitted). Posner thinks it a "good thing" that places like Santa
Monica and New York City have rent control - "not for the people of those cities but for the
rest of us, who can judge from these national experiments whether rent control has the effects that economists predict or those the Left predicts." Pp. 107-08.
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pends upon what, in reality, works. But that is no concession to the
emerging thesis of OL. The criticism of economics in law is not that
economic analysis is fanciful, unbelievable, or useless. It is very
useful. The criticism is, as Posner seemed to be saying in the Introduction, that economics is radically incomplete, and dangerous
without an enveloping, regulating morality and metaphysics.
But Posner's main target in OL is ... philosophy! - broadly
construed to include all metaphysics and ethics, particularly the allegedly "Catholic" contention that there is an objective, categorical,
and universal morality that can be known to be true. A very interesting thing about Posner's chapters criticizing legal writers is that
almost none defends or presupposes "philosophy" in this· sense.
They do not traffic in Truth - with a capital T - or metaphysics.
Bork is no metaphysician. He is almost as hostile to judicial philosophizing as Posner is. Ackerman is a genuine liberal, as Posner
would seem to be. Ely is a process theorist, as were Henry Hart
and Herbert Wechsler. Dworkin, whose work is deeply philosophical and concerned with legitimacy, is no genuine natural lawyer.
These writers are basically deep conventionalists when it comes to
morals. They take their bearings from the conscience and traditions
of the American people - our time-tested "can't helps." What
does Posner find so deeply objectionable in their work?
They all believe in some nonnegligible autonomy of law. Posner
indicts them for believing that the Constitution is an "algorithm for
deciding all cases" (p. 77); that law can be so "impersonal that the
values, personal experience, and social and political opinions of the
judge do not affect judicial outcomes" (pp. 20-21); that judging is a
"logical manipulation of principles" (p. 405); that judges achieve
"demonstrably correct'' results on a routine basis (p. 20).
Now, I have never encountered any writer, including those criticized by Posner, who held these views. Law is not mathematics or
geometry. No academic writer of my acquaintance has ever proposed that law be made, even by judges, oblivious to consequences.
Law and legal reasoning are, many have held, distinctive,
nonarithmetic somethings. Many writers, including those in this
wing of Posner's gallery, consider legal reasoning to be a restricted,
integrated analysis that :filters a judge's personal convictions about
correct or sound public policy.
Nevertheless, Posner sharply denies the "autonomy of law" the supposition that law possesses an "internal logic" and that it is
independent of contiguous social scientific disciplines. "Economic
analysis of law almost by definition denies law's autonomy" (p. 18).
If there is no such thing as "legal reasoning," what is Posner's idea
of "legal theory"? Posner has cast aside the whole moral philo-
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sophical approach to law, and with it, much contemporary jurisprudence. Again, what is his "legal theory"?
Posner's legal theory is professedly part pragmatism, part liberalism, and part economics. We now fear that this compound distills
down to economics. We are wondering what stands between economics and the whole of our social world, at least that very considerable part of it governed by law. Does law, if not legal reasoning,
serve as a barrier? Does theory? Does "legal theory"?
What is law? Posner is not entirely skeptical about law's determinacy. He allows that when a statute or judicial precedent plainly
governs a case the judge should apply it. Posner agrees that judges
make law sometimes, in the law's open areas, but he does not doubt
that, once decided, the instant case is recognized as law because of
its source, its judicial pedigree. Posner does not, for example, say
that a law that is economically perverse is no law at all.
Posner presupposes most of what "positivism" is classically understood to be about. Positivism is basically the effort, initiated by
Bentham and Austin, to develop the conceptual tools necessary to
do a sort of legal anthropology. What, descriptively, is treated as
law in a given community? To answer this question, positivists
would count the revealed Word of God as law if that is what the
society being studied adhered to. Posner assumes something like a
sources thesis for identifying what counts as law. But all this is implicit. It is not what he has in mind when he talks about "legal
theory."
Posner has some notion of intrasystemic authority: the "judicial
game," according to Posner, includes "at least a qualified adherence
to rules laid down in legislation and in previous cases" (p. 21). This
game, he cautions, can be justified in pragmatic and economic
terms, even if not conducted entirely as a pragmatic, economic exercise. Posner says that the judge should not articulate "substantively rational" - i.e., economically sensible - rules "whenever"
he thinks the received law is not rational. This is "[s]omething, but
perhaps not much" (p. 21) of a Dworkinian element in an institution - the law - that is "justified" by economic and pragmatic
values.
Law is, for Posner, not methodology. Law is a "subject"
(p. 324). But what is the "subject"? Is it just so many propositions
of law, disconnected points of light on the legal landscape? What
could a theory of them be?
It appears that, for Posner, some propositions contained in law
will stand fast against economics, at least until legislators begin to
behave "rationally" - i.e., economically. But how many depends
upon a judge's way of interpreting language, for Posner recommends economic reasoning in the law's open areas. How transpar-
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ent will the Posnerian judge take language to be, especially in the
superintending - superior to statute - realm of constitutional
interpretation?
Posner rejects all the theories of constitutional interpretation
that he considers. He declares against both "top down" and "bottom up" theories (pp. 172-75). He rejects outright the possibility of
a "middle way" between "judicial activism" and "strict constructionism" in constitutional interpretation (p. 199). Posner seems to
believe that if there is no reliable "technique" for interpreting the
Constitution - like "cryptography, or translation, or reading a
chest X-ray for signs of pulmon?ry disease" - there is little more
to "constitutional 'interpretation' " than the "reading of palms" and
the "interpretation of dreams" (p. 199). There surely is no such
"technique." So, Posner thinks his "instinctual" method of interpretation is as well-grounded as any other.
Posner expressly compares the problem of constitutional interpretation to that of interp~eting a work of music, suggesting once
again that there is no distinctly legal point of view. A capsule criticism of Bork's work: "[O]riginalism is neither the inevitable nor
even the natural method of interpreting a given body of texts, or
even the method of interpretation that is natural or inevitable for
conservatives to follow" (p. 240). Except that the question concerns only a theory of constitutional interpretation, not a general
theory of textual interpretation, and the criteria of aptness need not
be naturalness or inevitability.
Posner sums up his views on interpretation as follows:
One cannot choose among ... interpretations on semantic or conceptual grounds. Choice must be based on which interpretation seems
best in a sense that includes but also transcends considerations of fidelity to a text and a tradition. The interpretive question is ultimately
a political, economic, or social one to which social science may have
more to contribute than law. [p. 207]

Law, on this flexible view of interpreting it, would be pretty permeable to "social science."
What is "theory"? Facts are necessary but insufficient to intelligently answer the questions that law faces. As Posner says, "[a]
taste for fact . . . will tum to gall if unaccompanied by a taste for
theory" (p. 427). Facts alone do not constitute genuine knowledge.
Facts remain undetected among an undifferentiated mass of phenomena in the absence of a "theory." Theory guides the search for
"significant" facts (p. 427). The type of theory Posner has in mind,
he often says, is a non-normative or positive theory - economics is
a prime example - that lights up the important features of the featureless - nontheoretically considered - landscape. We want theory, says Posner, "not to describe the phenomena being
investigated but to add to our useful knowledge" (p. 430).
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Posner cautions, however, that we must be "pragmatic about
theory" (p. 431). "It is a tool rather than a glimpse of ultimate
truth, and the criteria of a good tool is its utility" (p. 431). What
distinguishes the useful theory? The "purpose of theory," he says,
is to "add to our useful knowledge, mainly of causal relations" (p.
430). Posner's "overall theoretical stance," then, stresses "facts"
that are organized "theoretically" into "social sciences" and radically depreciates the role of evaluative criteria.
What, finally, can "legal theory" be? Posner says that as subject,
not method, law is amenable to study by people in other disciplines,
like economics and political science (p. 324). His "legal theory" is
an "effective instrument for understanding and improving law, and
social institutions generally" (p. viii). What's this? Nonlawyers doing "legal theory"? Legal theorists lighting up "social institutions
generally"? Perhaps the best summary of what Posner thinks is
necessary to do "legal theory" is this: "a taste for fact, a respect for
social science, an eclectic curiosity, a desire to be practical, a belief
in individualism, and an openness to new perspectives" (p. viii).
There is nothing distinctly "legal" about this list. Anyone might be
a Posnerian legal theorist.
The subject matter of OL - "legal theory" - is fast disappearing from view. Apart from undeniably clear legal enactments, it has
disappeared into economics.
VI.

POSNER'S "LEGAL THEORY"

Let us examine a featured constructive proposal in 0 L - stated
in a chapter entitled "What do Judges Maximize?" - and Posner's
general conception of the Rule of Law. Does Posner's "legal theory" explain them or transform them?

A. Free Will and the Rule of Law
Posner is frank in OL about the basic point of criminal law, and
it is through the criminal law, as Posner understands it, that we can
appreciate Posner's brief comments on the "rule of law" itself (p.
20). Criminal law does not aim to "punish" the "guilty" and to protect the "innocent." Those are my scare quotes, though they might
as well be Posner's. For my - and, I suspect, the reader's - account of criminal law traffics in what Posner calls "imaginary entities" like "mind," "intent," and "free will."29 Criminal law treats
people as agents who are morally responsible for their bad acts.
29. Posner's casualness in handling metaphysical concepts is most evident concerning free
choice. He refers to the idea of free will - one of the law's "so-called metaphysical balloons" - more than once in OL. See pp. 397, 398, 445, 462. Posner's insouciance is consis·
tent with what most likely is his view that free will is not real, even if muddled talk about it
will not stop.
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Posner rejects this moralistic approach root and branch. The "principal social concern behind criminal punishment is a concern with
dangerousness rather than with mental states" (p. 397). The aim is
to leave "harmless" - not "innocent" (a moral category) - people
alone (p. 27). What prompts this view?
We can easily dispose .of one Posnerian apology for treating
criminals as dangerous objects rather than as autonomous agents.
He says that juries do not peek into the defendant's mind to see
what this object "intended" (p. 397). Yet, juries routinely and reliably infer from certain probative evidence what a person chose to
do. Posner does not consider the common case of trial on evidence
including a defendant's confession to the police, or statement to
some nonpolice personnel, to the effect: "I really wanted to kill
that s.o.b., and I did."
It is reasonably clear that Posner just does not believe in "free
choice" or "intention" at all.30 He is convinced that though we cannot now predict with great success what people will do, some day
we shall very likely be able to so predict. It is "cause and effect" all
the way down.31
Posner finds utility in retaining traditional moral language. It is
now not so much that jurors cannot understand what a criminal was
doing, but that it is somehow better that jurors not try to:
The connected concepts of intention and free will, applied for example in the setting of criminal punishment, support the idea that people
are different from other dangerous things, from rattlesnakes for example. . . . Thus, although free will and intention have little if any
place in the science game, they may have a place in the judicial game.
[p. 398] If we understand a criminal behavior, we are unlikely to accord him much dignity and respect. [p. 382]

Posner's criminal law is a "utility-maximizing instrument of social control" (p. 270), similar not to our criminal justice system but
to our practice whereby noncriminally dangerous people are detained to protect others - what might be called the "social hygiene
game," the public health "quarantine game," or the "zoo game."
30. See pp. 382, 397-98; POJ, supra note 11, at 166-67. Posner opposes getting inside the
defendant's mind to see what he chose to bring about to the capacity for judgment: "When
we succeed in looking at the world through another's eyes, we lose the perspective necessary
for judgment. We find ourselves in a stew of rationalization, warped perception, and overmastering emotion." P. 381. According to Posner, "the internal perspective - the putting
oneself in the other person's shoes - that is achieved by the exercise of empathetic imagination lacks nonnative significance." P. 381. Here is another example of Posner's unpredictable use of "nonnative." See supra note 8.
31. A telling manifestation of this faith is Posner's inability to distinguish regularities in
the conduct of an upright, well-integrated person - what some call "character" - from the
compulsions of an addict and the instinct of a sparrow. See POJ, supra note 11, at 173-74. In
OL, Posner states at one point: "To understand another person completely is .•. to understand the person as completely as a scientist understands an animal, which is to say as a
phenomenon of nature rather than as a free agent." P. 382.
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The same society "plays" all these "games" and also the "judicial
game." How would Posner explain that? How is it that, if people
are "cause and effect" all the way down, we make these distinctions,
so that restraint is criminal punishment here, civil commitment
there, etc.? Why then do we sustain a judicial game in which imaginary entities like free choice and guilt "support the idea" that people are not rattlesnakes? Has not Posner implied that people are
just misunderstood rattlesnakes?
Posner has not made any progress in his effort to explain, if not
justify, our "intuitions" against gruesome punishments and torture.
In the "utility-maximizing social control" game that he substitutes
for our system of criminal justice, such practices would have their
proper place. Posner can redescribe some of the raw behavioral
substance of criminal justice in economic terms, but not very much
of it, and the redescription ultimately fails. Posner simply is not
talking about our criminal justice system at all.
Posner says that "a major goal" of OL "is to nudge the judicial
game a little closer to the science game" (p. 8). It is no comfort,
then, that Posner considers the entire "rule of law" to be "a system
of social control" (p. 20). The rule of law, for him, is valuable because it is a system of social control operated "in accordance with
norms of disinterestedness and predictability" (p. 20) - a phrase
that aptly describes the scientist's management of laboratory
animals.
B.

The "Judicial Game"

Posner asks, "What Do Judges Maximize?" and devotes the
thirty-five pages of Chapter Three to answering the question. The
question initially posed is about "a theory" of the "behavior" of the
" 'ordinary' appellate judge" (p. 109). This focus away from the
"extraordinary" "judicial titan" to the ordinary judge "exemplifies
the pragmatist's interest in the world of fact, for most judges are, in
fact, ordinary" (p. 109). Posner adds the qualifying claim that as
"ordinary" folks, his subjects are not "truth-seeking," a proposition
for which he cites another writer's assertion that "most judges"
have been "plucked" from a deserved "intellectual obscurity."32
But even intellectually obscure people can and do seek truth. They
often have little trouble finding certain truths, like the truths that
slavery is wrong and that it is wrong to punish the innocent.
The ordinary federal judge's relative insulation from ordinary
self-interest makes them interesting puzzles to Posner. No matter
what they do - short of high crimes or misdemeanors - they
32. P. 110 n.3 (quoting Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in
Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE LJ. 191,
221 (1991)).
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make the same money, and generally enjoy much the same power,
prestige, and perks. What makes their behavior such a challenge to
economic analysis of law, then, is that the quality and quantity of
the work they do is not instrumental to what ordinarily counts as an
incentive, as a benefit worth expending the resources of time and
energy for. The question is, why do they do much work at all? 33
This is a challenge not only to "economic analysis of law" but,
Posner says, "more broadly to the universalist claims of the economic theory of human behavior" (p. 112).
Posner implicitly eliminates the possibility that even "ordinary"
judges find their work intrinsically worthwhile, that the work is its
own reason for doing it, in the sense that knowledge and excellence
in work are intelligibly worthwhile just in themselves. For allowing
that there are such basically valuable things - just in themselves
and not as means to some further end - would force Posner out of
his entirely instrumental, technical conception of rationality.
Posner stipulates out of the model a "desire to promote the public
interest" (p. 118). Why? It would be inconsistent with "treating
judges as 'ordinary' people."34
Posner finds the most promising avenue of explaining judges'
behavior in analogies to voting in elections. The "consumption
value" of voting depends on making "a deliberate choice of whom
to vote for" (p. 123). Posner realizes that this explains at most that
judges cast a vote. Why do they "vote for one side rather than another, or to vote for one interpretation of a statute or legal doctrine
rather than another, or to adopt one judicial philosophy ... rather
than another?" (p. 126). Posner has yet to explain why federal
judges work hard rather than play golf in Scottsdale. They could
golf in Scottsdale - a lot - and get all the "consumption value"
advanced so far by voting in cases. Voting is not what consumes
them. What takes so much time, Posner must realize, is the crafting
of opinions to justify and to explain votes.
We seem to have moved on, in any event, to a different question, a question something like: Why does Judge X become a strict
constructionist? Posner rules out the possibility that Judge X comes
to "strict constructionism" because it is true, valid, or sound, either
philosophically or based upon a controlling enactment - like the
Constitution (p. 127). Posner finds the analogue of his choice: "the
choices we make watching dramatic or cinematic performances" (p.
127).
33. "Most" federal appellate judges work "quite hard - often at an age when their counterparts in private practice have retired and are living in Scottsdale or La Jolla . . . . Their
utility function must in short contain something besides leisure and the judicial salary." P.
117.
34. P. 118. Posner says that views on the public interest "affect" judicial preferences "but
only insofar as decisions expressing those views enhance the judge's utility." P. 118.
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The judge brings to bear on his spectatorial function not only a range
of personal and political preferences but also a specialized cultural
competence - his knowledge of and experience in "the law." And if
he is an appellate judge he will consult with his professional colleagues before making up his mind.
Of course few legal cases have the rich ambiguities of Hamlet.
Many cases involve puzzles soluble with the technical tools of legal
analysis - here the judge is like the reader of a detective story. The
jury as factfinder performs a similar function. It is a different kind of
spectatorship from the one I am stressing here, that of the appellate
judge asked to decide not where truth lies but which party has the
better case. But in either case the choice, like that of the theater audience, is a disinterested one; the judge's or jury's income is not affected
by it. A further point is that the less informed the tribunal is, the
more "dramatic" the trial must be to hold the "audience's" attention.
It is not surprising that Anglo-American trials, historically dominated
by juries, are more dramatic than Continental trials, historically dominated by professional judges. [p. 128]

Are we now trying to explain the judge's or jury's decision at
trial? Posner does not explicitly shift the focus. Even so, we have
not progressed in our search for the cause of judicial diligence: they
can take a particular view of Hamlet without producing the lengthy
opinions that take so much of their time.
So why do judges write lengthy opinions? According to Posner,
they do so in order to maximize the "pleasure of judging" (p. 131).
Posner then addresses an obvious objection to his explanation of
judges as maximizers of such psychic satisfaction. Why do judges
act so, well, judicial? Why not sock it to the irritating litigant or the
irksome colleague, and affirm racial, class, or gender solidarity?
Why, in other words, if judges maxiiµize "pleasure" do they engage
in what would appear to be so much self-denial?
The pleasure of judging is bound up with compliance with certain selflimiting rules that define the "game" of judging. It is a source of satisfaction to a judge to vote for the irritating litigant, for the lawyer who
fails to exhibit proper deference to the court, for the side that represents a different social class from that of the judges. It is by doing
such things that you know you are playing the judge role, not some
other role; and judges for the most part are people who want to be judges. [p. 131]

This is hard to fathom. It is like saying that everyone seeks pleasure, but that some people - let us call them "stoics" - get pleasure by denying themselves pleasure.
The claim is more peculiar still. The judicial game's "raw materials" are "the ugly realities of life": "hatred, disease, crime, betrayal, war, poverty, bereavement, despair" (pp. 133-34). The
pleasure-seeking judge seeks out this world. The "judicial game"
- which transmutes these ugly things into intellectual problems of
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rights and duties - "comfort[s]" judges by insulating them from, in
Posner's example, thinking themselves killers when they uphold the
death penalty (pp. 133-34).
Posner recognizes that no ordinary person would seek pleasure
by seeking out repugnant things and then scrambling to shield oneself from them once found. Why bother in the first place? Posner
says that self-selection and the careful screening "of judicial candidates" assure that most lawyers who become judges will, nevertheless, be people who do. On this view, we surely should wish for an
explanation of these features of the judicial task - features commonly called the "rule of law" - and not of the pleasure curve of
judges who might want to play by that rule. The more traditional
- and accurate - view of judging supposes precisely that these
distinctive features are there to assure, as much as possible, that
despite the normal human biases, proclivities, and frailties of the
judges - their "utility curve" if you like - litigants get roughly
equal justice.
Posner does not suggest that anyone would have created a judicial system in order to satisfy this highly unusual pleasure curve.
He does not quite ask us to believe that the U.S. Supreme Court
was created, and is sustained by, a commitment to judges' pleasure.
Besides, Posner says that "many cases" cannot be decided by reference to extant, conventional legal materials (p. 131). I suppose
many can. On Posner's view, they present no opportunity for
choice at all - either for or against Hamlet. Why do judges do any
work on these cases? Finally, Posner "doubt[s] that any judge subjectively experiences his job" in the way he models it in the chapter.
He confesses: "I don't" (p. 110 n.4).
CONCLUSION

What is left standing in "legal theory" between the economic
juggernaut and the awful consequences Posner sketched in his Introduction? Moral philosophy has been swept aside, along with
legal reasoning, the fruits of their inquiries strewn about like so
many derelict facts. Economics has taken their measure, assimilating them under collaborating descriptions like "mental externality."
Posner says that even "if there are no deep, metaphysical realities of the sort that religious and philosophical thinkers" have long
believed in, we are not facing the abyss (p. 457). "There are," he
explains, "mid-level social scientific theories and empirical methodologies whose utility is not undermined" by metaphysics' demise
(pp. 457-58). Yes, but if all there is are highly organized information and technical operations performable upon it - engineering,
psychology, military science, and the like - who or what will do the
necessary work of integration?
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Posner does not bring this precise question to the surface. But
economics - the "instrumental" science par excellence, queen of
the social sciences - is, when 0 L has run its course, the only answer that Posner can possibly offer.

